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Abstract
In a variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how
many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids.
Bidders are uncertain about the sellers cost. We experimentally inves-
tigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for
the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out
that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and
consequently yields higher revenues and prots for the seller. Some-
what surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher
number of transactions, which makes it the more e¢ cient auction for-
mat.
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1 Introduction
Suppose you want to sell several homogeneous items (concert tickets, photo
prints, tie-dyed Tshirts, stocks in an IPO, etc.). You are uncertain about
the willingness to pay of potential buyers for those objects. How should you
go about selling the objects if each buyer demands only one item? Given the
uncertainty about willingness to pay, an auction is an obvious choice. But
should you use a uniform price auction or a discriminatory price auction?
We assume that the sellers production cost (or his reserve price) for
each object is his private information.1 In this case it is of advantage to the
seller to design the auction as one with variable supply, that is, an auction in
which the number of items sold is not xed in advance but may depend on
the bids. Of course, bidders take the prot maximizing choice of the seller
with respect to the number of items into account when deciding on their
bids. We also assume that each bidder attaches the same value to an item
(unknown to the seller).2
In the discriminatory auction each bidder has to pay his bid if being
served by the seller. Obviously, the seller will do so if and only if the bid is
at least as high as the sellers marginal production cost.
In the uniform auction all bidders served by the seller pay the same
price, which equals the lowest bid served.3 Clearly, if all bids are below
marginal cost, the seller will not sell any items. However, if several of the
bids are above marginal cost, the seller must decide whether to serve a
smaller number of buyers and receive a higher price, or serve a larger number
of buyers at a lower price.
Damianov and Becker (2007) analyze this situation for the general case
with n bidders and general distributions of production cost. They show that
1As an example consider a secret reserve priceon eBay.
2This is mainly for simplicity and can be considered a rst step to a more general
analysis. But it can also be justied in some situations, e.g. when a resale market exists
for the items.
3 In the literature one sometimes nds an alternative version in which the price equals
the highest bid not served. However, in practice the latter version does not seem to be
in much use, e.g. most treasury auctions use our version. Furthermore, in the current
setting with unit demand by bidders, the highestbidnotserved rule would not make
much sense as the seller could never sell all units.
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in every symmetric equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform
than in the discriminatory auction. In the case of two bidders, this result
holds even for all rationalizable bids. Consequently, the uniform auction
is more protable for the seller as it generates higher revenues. Somewhat
surprisingly, the uniform auction is also more e¢ cient as it generates a higher
trade volume.4 This may seem counterintuitive as in the discriminatory
auction all bids above marginal cost are being served whereas in the uniform
auction, some bids above marginal cost are rejected by the seller.
In this paper we experimentally test the predictions of Damianov and
Becker (2007). Although variable supply auctions are actually quite frequent
in reality,5 to our knowledge, this institutional feature of auctions has so far
not been explored experimentally. We consider an auction with two bidders
and a uniform distribution of sellers production cost. Section 2 introduces
the experimental design. In Section 3 we derive the theoretical predictions
for a uniform cost distribution on [0; 200]. In the discriminatory auction,
there is a strictly dominant strategy of bidding 100. For the uniform price
auction, we sharpen the prediction of Damianov and Becker (2007) and
narrow down the set of rationalizable strategies to a relatively small interval
of [133; 170]. In particular, we obtain clear and testable predictions for
the di¤erence between the two auctions. The uniform auction should yield
signicantly higher bids, higher revenues and prots for the seller, and a
higher number of transactions.
In Section 4 we present the experimental results, which are remarkably
close to the theoretical predictions. As predicted, bids, prots, revenues,
and number of transactions are signicantly higher in the uniform auction.
Subjects seem to learn how to bid in these auctions as the experimental
data are even closer to the theoretical predictions for the second half of the
experiment. Other factors, like the extent of experience with auctions such
as eBay, do not seem to matter for bidding behavior of our subjects. In
Section 5 we conclude. Some proofs and the instructions for the experiment
4The latter result holds for all weakly convex distribution functions of production cost.
5See Loxley and Salant (2004, p. 224), Nyborg et. al. (2002, p. 422), and Busaba
et al. (2001) for examples of variable supply auctions for electricity, Treasury bills, and
IPOs, respectively.
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are collected in an appendix.
2 Experimental design
In a computerized experiment we studied a series of auction markets with
variable supply.6 In each auction two bidders had the opportunity to bid
for objects, which had a common redemption value of v = 200 Cents (= 2
Euros). All payo¤s were denominated in actual (Euro-)Cents such that no
exchange rate was necessary.
The seller (whose role was played by the computer program) in each
round had constant marginal cost c of production for the objects. However,
in each round the marginal cost (in Cents) were drawn from an i.i.d. uni-
form distribution on f0; 0:1; 0:2; :::; 199:9; 200:0g and the realizations were
unknown to bidders at the time of bidding.7 The seller could choose to sell
0, 1 or 2 objects in each auction and would always choose the prot maxi-
mizing option. This rule was known to subjects. Each bidder submitted a
bid for one object in each round. Bids could be any amount (in Cents) from
the set f0; 0:1; 0:2; :::; 219:9; 220:0g, which makes for an almost continuous
strategy set.
The number of auction periods was 20 in all sessions and this was com-
monly known. At the beginning of the experiment each bidder received an
endowment of 400 Cents, which made it impossible to lose money in the
experiment. After each auction period, bidders were informed about the
size of the two bids, how many units were sold (0,1, or 2), what the payo¤s
for the two bidders were, what the production cost of the seller were, and
their cumulative payo¤ up to that round. Subjects were asked to record all
this information on a record sheet.
There were two treatments.
 In the discriminatory pricing treatment, the computer would sell a
6We thank Urs Fischbacher (2007) for providing the computer package z-tree.
7To improve the pairwise comparison across treatments, the cost realizations were
drawn ahead of time and the same set of cost realizations was used for both of our treat-
ments, uniform and discriminatory.
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unit to each bidder who bid above this periods marginal cost and
subjects had to pay their respective bid.
 In the uniform pricing treatment, the auction price equaled the lowest
bid that was served by the seller. The seller maximized his prots
by either selling 0 (if both bids were below marginal cost), one or
two units. Clearly, the seller would sell one unit rather than two if
b1   c > 2(b2   c), where b1 > b2 are the bids and c the marginal cost.
If indi¤erent, we assumed that the seller would sell to both bidders.
These rules were explained to subjects in detail and with examples. Sev-
eral test questions were conducted to make sure subjects understood the
auction rules. Instructions (see Appendix B) were written on paper and
distributed in the beginning of each session. When subjects were familiar
with the rules, we started the rst round.
The experiments were conducted in June 2007 in the computer lab of
the SFB 504, Mannheim. All subjects were recruited via the ORSEE online
recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). In each session 18 subjects participated,
constituting three matching groups of six bidders. When entering the lab,
subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals in the lab such
that they could not infer with whom they would interact in a group of six.
Each group was independent of the others. Matching inside a group was
done randomly in each round such that no subject could infer who the other
bidder was. For both treatments we had six independent matching groups
of subjects making a total of 72 (= 2  6  6) subjects who participated
in the experiment.
Subjects were paid the sum of their earnings from all auctions. The av-
erage payo¤was about Euro 12.40. Experiments lasted less than 60 minutes
including instruction time.
4
3 Theoretical predictions
In this section we derive theoretical predictions about bidding behavior in a
twoplayer discriminatory and a uniform price auction, respectively.8 Note
that the seller is not a player in the auction game as the seller behaves
according to a xed rule (prot maximization) and is thus part of the auction
rules. In the experiment the seller was played by a computer program and
its rules were known to subjects.
Buyersredemption values are v. The sellers marginal cost are uniformly
distributed over the interval [0; v] and bids are from the interval [0; 1:1v]:9
Since equilibria may well di¤er for a discrete strategy space, we also consider
a nite grid,    [0; 1:1v] with grid size 0:01v.
The case of the discriminatory auction is a straightforward decision prob-
lem for each bidder. Since the seller serves all bids (weakly) above marginal
cost and the price a bidder pays equals his bid, optimal strategies are in-
dependent of the other player. The expected payo¤ of bidder i is given
by the payo¤ conditional on winning times the probability of winning, that
is RDi (b1; b2) = (v   bi)bi=v: The optimal bid is bDi = v=2. Since this is
independent of the other player, we have
Proposition 1 In the discriminatory auction it is a strictly dominant strat-
egy to bid v=2.
Consequently, the expected revenues of the seller are v and the expected
number of transactions per round is 1.
The case of the uniform price auction is more complex. The question of
whether a bidder will be served and the price to be paid depend on both
bids b1 and b2. If b1 < b2, then bidder 1 will be served if it is protable
for the seller to sell both units at the price of b1, which is the case when
2(b1   c)  b2   c or c  2b1   b2. Hence, bidder 1 will be served with
probability Prob(c  2b1   b2) if b2=2  b1 < b2. If b1 < b2=2; bidder 1 will
not be served.
8For the general case with n players and general distributions of valuations see Dami-
anov and Becker (2007).
9 In the experiment v = 200 and bids bi 2 [0; 220].
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Let us next consider the case b2  b1. Both bidders are served and pay b2
if 2(b2  c)  b1  c, and the probability for this event is Prob(c  2b2  b1)
for b1  2b2 and zero otherwise. Only bidder 1 is served and pays b1 if
2b2 b1 < c < b1. This event occurs with probability Prob(2b2 b1 < c  b1).
For 2b2 < b1, the latter probability reduces to Prob(c  b1). To summarize,
the expected payo¤ of bidder 1 (the payo¤ of bidder 2 can be determined
analogously) is RU1 (b1; b2) =
1
v

8>>>><>>>>:
(v   b1)Prob(c  b1) for 2b2 < b1;
(v   b2)Prob(c  2b2   b1)
+ (v   b1)Prob(2b2   b1 < c  b1) for b2  b1  2b2;
(v   b1)Prob(c  2b1   b2) for b2=2  b1 < b2;
0 for b1 < b2=2:
(1)
Note rst that no symmetric, purestrategy equilibrium exists for the
uniform auction. The intuition for why no pair (b; b); in particular not
(v=2; v=2); can be an equilibrium, is as follows. Suppose b1 = b2 and bidder
1 considers increasing his bid marginally to b1 + " < v. If c > b1 + "; then
no trade takes place anyway. If c < b2   ", bidder 1 is equally well o¤ as
without the increase: in both cases he receives an item and pays b2 since the
seller nds it protable to sell two units. If b2 < c < b1 + ", then bidder 1
will obtain the item and receive payo¤ v  b1  " > 0:Without the increase,
bidder 1s payo¤ would have been 0. This event happens with probability ".
Finally, if b2   " < c < b2, bidder 1 will receive item but pays " more than
necessary. Again, this event happens with probability ": Hence, in total
there is a gain from the deviation of v  b1  " with probability " and a loss
of " with probability ". For " small enough, the expected gain exceeds the
expected loss and makes the deviation protable.10
Proposition 2 In the uniform price auction, strategies below (2=3)v and
above 0:84v do not survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies.
10For high bids b1 = b2, and in particular for b2 = v, decreasing his bid is also protable
for bidder 1 as his payo¤ function has a minimum at the 45-line for high b2.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Note that in twoplayer games the set of rationalizable strategies is iden-
tical to the set of strategies that survive the iterative elimination of strictly
dominated strategies (see e.g. Pearce, 1984). We will therefore use those
concepts interchangeably in this paper. In Figure 1 the set of rational-
izable strategies for both players is shown as the square between the 23v-
and the 0:85v-lines. Also shown are the best response correspondences
(see the Appendix for details). At the intersections of the best response
correspondences there are two asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria
(bi; b i) = (0:77v; 0:69v), i = 1; 2.
With the help of the numerical algorithm Gambit (McKelvey et al.,
2007), we were able (for a grid   with grid size 0.01v) to calculate a symmet-
ric mixed strategy equilibrium but also more than a thousand asymmetric
mixed strategy equilibria with support in [0:69v; 0:81v]: Given this multi-
plicity of equilibria, it is best to focus on the set of rationalizable strategies,
which necessarily contains the support of all Nash equilibria.
Table 1 summarizes the predictions for the two auction formats given the
parameters used in the experiment (v = 200). The rationalizable bids are
given by Proposition 2. The upper and the lower limits for prots, revenues,
and number of transactions are obtained by using the lowest, respectively
highest, rationalizable bids for both players. For example, when both bidders
bid 133.3, then expected revenues are 133.3 times the expected number of
transactions, i.e. 133:3 4=3 = 177: 7.
The main prediction is clearly that the uniform auction dominates the
discriminatory auction from the sellers viewpoint. Since all rationalizable
bids are strictly higher in the uniform auction, sellers prots and revenues
exceed those in the discriminatory auction. Moreover, the uniform auction
is more e¢ cient because the expected number of transactions is higher.
The last result seems counterintuitive since in the discriminatory auction
all bids above marginal cost are being served while in the uniform auction,
some bids above marginal cost are rejected by the seller. Nevertheless, bids
are so much higher in the uniform auction treatment that they result in a
7
discriminatory
uniform
1/2 0.85       1 × v
1
2/3
1/2
0
2/3
0.85
× v
b1
b2*(b1)
b1*(b2)
Figure 1: Set of rationalizable bids (shaded area) and pure strategy best
reply correspondences for the uniform price auction
Note: Unique equilibrium for discriminatory auction shown for comparison.
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Table 1: Theoretical predictions for parameters used in the exper-
iment
rationalizable expected expected seller expected # of
Auction bids seller prots revenues transactions
Uniform [133:3; 170] [88:8; 144:5] [177:7; 289:0] [4=3; 1:7]
Discriminatory 100 50 100 1
Note: All measures are calculated per round and for both bidders.
signicantly higher number of transactions.
4 Experimental results
We can now compare the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 1 to
the data from our experiment. Table 2 shows mean bids, mean seller prots
and revenues, and the average number of transactions per round. The table
presents those measures separately for each treatment and data from all
rounds and the nal 10 rounds, respectively.
Mean values of all four measures are remarkably close to the theoretical
predictions for the discriminatory auction. Data for the uniform distribution
also lie well within the predicted range. The predictions are even more
accurate for the nal 10 rounds. As predicted, mean bids are substantially
higher in the uniform auction, which results in higher prots and revenues
for sellers. E¢ ciency is also higher in the uniform auction as the average
number of transactions per round is more than 1/3 higher for the uniform
auction. All di¤erences between the respective measures for our treatments
are signicantly di¤erent at the 1% level of a twosided MWU test (see, e.g.,
Siegel and Castellan, 1988) taking each matching group of 6 subjects as an
independent observation.
Furthermore, comparing the data to the theoretical predictions for the
discriminatory auction (where we have a point prediction) with a Wilcoxon
test, we nd that the predictions for bids, seller revenues, and number of
transactions are not signicantly di¤erent from the experimental data at
9
Table 2: Experimental results
mean bids mean seller mean seller mean # of
Treatment prots revenues transactions
Uniform (all rounds) 145.10 97.92 195.20 1.35
Uniform (rounds 11-20) 148.73 110.51 199.20 1.37
Discr. (all rounds) 105.81 59.25 116.39 1.05
Discr. (rounds 11-20) 102.78 64.64 103.07 0.98
Note:  signicantly di¤erent from the respective other treatment for the same set of
rounds at the 1% level of a two-sided MWU test.
any conventional signicance level.
The fact that the data are closer to the predictions for the second half
of the experiments suggests that there is learning over time. In fact, Figure
2 shows how bids in the discriminatory auctions converge to the theoretical
prediction of 100 while bids in the uniform auction start slightly below the
predicted range but increase from there.
Figures 3 and 4 take a closer look at the distribution of individual bids,
or pair of bids, respectively. The left panel of Figure 3 shows a histogram of
bids in the discriminatory auction. More than 40% of bids lie in the bracket
containing the unique Nash equilibrium at 100 (in fact 37.6% are concen-
trated exactly on bids of 100.0). In contrast, the right panel shows bids
in the uniform auction with a mode at 150. Overall, in the discriminatory
auction only 11% of bids lie above 133, while in the uniform auction 75% of
bids lie above this threshold.
When we consider the pairs of bids that were actually (randomly) matched
in the experiment, we get Figure 4.11 Bids in the discriminatory auction are
scattered around 100. Only three pairs of bids are jointly above 133.3.
Bids in the uniform auction are predominantly in the area of rationalizable
strategies, the square between the lines at 133.3 and 170.
Figure 5 shows for each subject in the uniform price treatment the bid
11Note that the matching for the scatter diagram is random and therefore somewhat
arbitrary. Nevertheless, these are the outcomes subjects observed in the experiment after
each period.
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Figure 2: Time path of mean bids in the discriminatory and the uniform
auction over the 20 rounds of the experiment.
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Figure 3: Distribution of individual bids in the discriminatory auction (left
panel) and the uniform auction (right panel).
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Figure 4: Scatter diagram of pairs of bids (as matched in the experiment)
for the discriminatory auction (left panel) and the uniform auction (right
panel).
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distribution in the second half of the experiment (see Figure 8 in the Appen-
dix for all periods). Given the multiplicity of equilibria, this allows to shed
some more light on subjectsstrategies. While some subjects seem to play
pure strategies, which, in fact, seem fairly close to the asymmetric pure equi-
librium strategies, others mix over a broader range of strategies. However,
almost all bids lie in the range of rationalizable strategies [133:3; 170].
Finally, we asked subjects in the postexperimental questionnaire how
much experience they had with auctions (e.g. eBay). We suspected that
subjects with a lot of auction experience might show a bidding behavior that
is closer to equilibrium behavior. In fact, a large number of subjects had
considerable experience. The average number of auctions in which subjects
had participated was 37.1 with a maximum of 300.
However, regressing auction experience together with treatment dum-
mies on bids did not produce any signicant coe¢ cients for auction experi-
ence. The reason for this result may be that bidding behavior is already so
close to equilibrium or rationalizable behavior that experience with auctions
cannot make a di¤erence.
5 Related Literature
The uniform and the discriminatory auction formats are widely used in
practice for the sale of homogeneous goods. It is therefore not surprising
that economists have long debated on the appropriate auction format for a
variety of multiunit markets, e.g. markets for Treasury bills, IPOs, emission
permits, and electricity.
Because of the complexity and the specicity of these market environ-
ments, the literature does not yield an unambiguous ranking of the two
auction formats. Theoretical, empirical, and experimental results vary with
the exact institutional structure of the auction under consideration.
The main argument against uniform price auctions is due to Wilson
(1979), who presents a model in which bidders announce downwardsloping
demand schedules to the seller. By submitting steep demand schedules, bid-
ders can inhibit competition, and thereby sustain equilibria at arbitrarily
13
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Figure 5: Distribution of bids for each individual subject in the uniform
price treatment, periods 11-20.
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low prices. This argument has been further developed by Back and Zender
(1993) who provide a ranking of the two auctions favoring the discrimina-
tory auction. However, Kremer and Nyborg (2004a, 2004b) show that the
underpricing equilibria in the uniform price auction are not robust to alter-
native formulations of the auction model (e.g. when prices and quantities
are discrete or when the seller use the pro ratarationing rule).12
The main argument in favor of uniform price auction is based on an
application of the linkage principle(see Milgrom, 1989, p.16). According
to this principle, making the price paid by a bidder dependent on other bids,
should increase revenues. However, the principle does not generally apply
to multiunit auctions (see e.g. Perry and Reny, 1999).
The most important strategic feature of the auctions considered in the
present paper is that it is a variable supply auction. The impact of variable
supply on bidding has recently been the focus of much theoretical research.
Back and Zender (2001) show that the seller can substantially reduce under-
pricing in the uniform price auction if he retains the right to reduce supply
after the bidding. McAdams (2007) demonstrates further that lowprice
equilibria will be completely eliminated if the seller can both extend and
reduce supply quantity. Both models assume that buyers have the same
deterministic value. In contrast, Lengwiler (1999) introduces uncertainty on
the part of the bidders with respect to the marginal cost of the seller. To
keep the setting tractable he allows bidders to submit quantity bids only at
two exogenously given price levels, and nds an ambiguous ranking of the
uniform price and the discriminatory auction in terms of revenues. For the
current paper most relevant are the results of Damianov and Becker (2007)
who show that in a setting with variable supply and singleunit demand of
bidders, the uniform auctions dominates the discriminatory auction in terms
of revenues and prots for the seller and e¢ ciency.
Empirical research, especially on Treasury auctions, is largely in favor
of the uniform auction format. In particular, there seems to be little evi-
dence of lowprice equilibria in uniform price auctions. In fact, empirical
12See also Keloharju et al. (2005) who do not nd any evidence for underpricing equi-
libria in Finnish treasury securities auctions.
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evidence suggests that underpricing, as measured by the di¤erence between
the auctions stopout prices and secondary market prices, is higher in dis-
criminatory auctions (see Umlauf, 1993, Nyborg, and Sundaresan, 1996, and
Goldreich, 2006). It has also been observed (see e.g. Keloharju et al., 2005,
for an overview of this literature) that in many of the auctions for Trea-
sury bonds and IPOs, sellers adjust supply after observing bids, and this
e¤ectively changes the strategic structure of the auction game.
Given the lack of denite conclusions from the theoretical literature, a lot
of attention has naturally been focused on the use of experimental methods
for comparison of the two auctions and the evaluation of policy proposals.
By and large, the experimental results either nd no clear di¤erence between
the two auction formats or favor the uniform price auction.
Smith (1967) compares the uniform price and the discriminatory auctions
in a Treasury market experiment in which the quantity to be sold is known
to bidders prior to the bidding and the asset has a common resale value. He
observes that the variance of bids in the uniform price auction is generally
higher but nds no clear ranking in terms of revenues. Goswati, Noe, and
Rebello (1996) present the only experiment which favors the discriminatory
auction due to the fact that communication among bidders prior to the auc-
tion facilitates collusion more in the uniform price auction than in the dis-
criminatory auction. Cox, Smith, and Walker (1985) conduct an experiment
in which each buyer demands a single unit and found no signicant di¤er-
ences in the revenue generation properties of the two auctions. Miller and
Plott (1985) allow for multiunit demand and xed supply and observe that
the uniform price auction generates higher revenues when demand is elastic
and the discriminatory auction performs better when demand is inelastic.
Finally, Abbink et al. (2006) compare the uniform, the discriminatory, and
an auction format used by the Bank of Spain for selling government bonds.
They nd that the uniform and the Spanish auction formats outperform the
discriminatory auction in terms of revenues for the seller.
Rassenti, Smith, and Wilson (2003) perform an electricity market exper-
iment in which subjects are sellers and submit step supply functions. De-
mand is stochastic and determined by the computer. Thus, trading quantity
16
in this experiment is endogenous, although not of the type studied in the
present experiment. Yet, similarly to the present experiment, the uniform
auction is found to be more favorable to the auctioneer.
In a related electricity market experiment, Abbink, Brandts, and Mc-
Daniel (2003) focus on the aspect of asymmetric information regarding mar-
ket demand and nd that the discriminatory auction leads to a less e¢ cient
outcome. In symmetric information treatments, prices and volatility are not
signicantly di¤erent.
Auctions have also been considered in the design of markets for allocating
resources to protect the environment. Cason and Plott (1996) experimen-
tally compare the uniform price double auction to the auction proposed by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1990. In the EPA auction,
bids are arranged from highest to lowest, and asks are arranged from lowest
to highest. Then the lowest ask is matched with the highest bid and trade
occurs at the bid price. Thus, from biddersperspective the EPA auction
is similar to the discriminatory auction because bidders are required to pay
their bid prices. Similarly to what we observe in the present experiment,
discriminatory pricing leads to higher underbidding and lower trade volume
and e¢ ciency.
Cason and Gangadharan (2005) perform a procurement experiment in
which sellers o¤er environmental projects and compete in the dimensions of
ask price and level of environmental improvement. The regulator spends a
certain monetary budget to purchase at most one project from each seller
with the goal of achieving the highest environmental benet. In the uniform
price treatment of this experiment, o¤ers are not substantially di¤erent from
costs,13 whereas in the discriminatory treatment o¤ers exceed costs substan-
tially.
13 In their uniform price auction treatment the price is set by the rst rejected bid rather
than the last accepted bid as we assume in the present experiment.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we report results of an experiment that compares uniform price
auctions to discriminatory auctions in a setting with variable supply. The
experimental results are remarkably close to the theoretical predictions. Just
as theory predicts, bids are substantially higher in the uniform auction, and,
consequently, so are revenues and prots for the seller. Despite the fact that
in the discriminatory auction the seller never rejects bids that are above his
marginal cost, the number of transactions are higher in the uniform auction,
which implies that the uniform auction is also the more e¢ cient auction in
this setting.
The theoretical results hold under somewhat restrictive assumptions.
It would be desirable to relax some of those assumptions in future work,
in particular, the assumption that both bidders have the same value v.
We see this assumption mainly as a technical simplication as does much
of the literature (see Back and Zender, 2001; McAdams, 2007). We are
relatively condent that the results are robust to the introduction of some
asymmetry with respect to biddersvalues but future research needs to verify
this conjecture. We would also conjecture that the experimental results are
robust to moderate asymmetry in biddersvalues.
Another interesting extension would be to allow for multiunit demand
by bidders. While some progress has been made in the literature,14 this
problems remains a challenge for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies
Proof of Proposition 2. In order to simplify notation in this Appendix,
let v = 1 without loss of generality. Applying the uniform distribution of
costs, the payo¤ function (1) becomes
RU1 (b1; b2) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  b1)minfb1; 1g for 2b2  b1;
(1  b2)min(2b2   b1; 1)
+ (1  b1)minf2b1   2b2; 1g for b2  b1 < 2b2;
(1  b1)minf2b1   b2; 1g for b2=2  b1 < b2;
0 for b1 < b2=2:
(2)
Observe rst that bidding above ones valuation of 1 is strictly dominated
by bidding 1 since for all points where the partial derivative is dened
@RU1 (b1; b2)
@b1
< 0; 8b1  1 and 8b2 2 [0; 1:1]:
The intuition for this is obvious. If b1 > 1 and the price bidder 1 pays
equals b1, he is clearly better o¤ lowering his bid. Alternatively, the price
bidder 1 pays is determined by b2; which happens with probability 2b2  b1:
Lowering b1 increases this probablity and makes bidder 1 better o¤. In the
following we shall therefore work with the restricted strategy set [0; 1]. The
min operators in (2) can then be replaced by their rst argument.
Second, we notice that for b2 2 [0; 2=3] and b1 2 (b2=2;minfb2+ 112 ; 2=3g)
(see areas A and B in Figure 6) the expected payo¤ RU1 (b1; b2) is strictly
increasing in b1; and for b1 < b2=2 we have RU1 (b1; b2) = 0 (see area C in
Figure 6).
Third, we observe that pure strategies from the interval [0; 112) are not
best responses to any (mixed) strategy of bidder 2.15 Indeed, if bidder 2
plays a mixed strategy which places a positive probability on the interval
[0; 212), then bidding 1=12 will lead to a strictly higher payo¤ for bidder 1
than using any of the pure strategies from the interval [0; 112). On the other
15 In two-player games the property of never a best response is equivalent to being
strictly dominated.
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Figure 6: The expected payo¤of bidder 1 in the uniform price auction is zero
in area C, strictly increasing in b1 in areas A and B and strictly decreasing
in area D.
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Figure 7: Eight steps of elimination of non-rationalizable strategies in the
uniform price auction.
hand, if bidder 2 plays a mixed strategy which places a zero probability on
the interval [0; 212), then any strategy b1 2 [0; 112) leads to a zero expected
payo¤ for bidder 1. In this case submitting a bid of, for instance, 3=4, would
guarantee a positive payo¤ (bidder 2 does not bid above 1). Thus, pure
strategies from the interval [0; 112) can be eliminated as not being a best
response to any strategy of bidder 2, i.e. non-rationalizable. Knowing that
there are no rationalizable bids below 1=12 for each player, we can perform
a second step of elimination with respect to the strategies from the interval
[ 112 ;
2
12). Playing
2
12 guarantees a strictly higher payo¤ when bidder 2 uses
a (mixed) strategy placing a positive probability on the interval [ 112 ;
2
12);
and playing 3=4 gives a strictly higher payo¤ when bidder 2 uses a (mixed)
strategy that does not place a positive probability on that interval.
With this iterative procedure we can perform eight steps of elimination
by subsequently deleting the strategies from the intervals [0; 112), [
1
12 ;
2
12),
[ 212 ;
3
12),. . . , [
7
12 ;
8
12) (see Figure 7 for an illustration).
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Further, direct inspection of the payo¤ function shows that b1 = 0:69
strictly dominates all pure strategies from the interval [0:85; 1] once strate-
gies b2 > 1 are eliminated. Using Gambit we nd that no further pure
strategies can be eliminated by any other strategy (pure or mixed). That
is, all remaining strategies in the interval [0:66; 0:84] are rationalizable.
Nash equilibria
From (2) we can derive the (pure) best response correspondence,
b1 (b2) := argmax
b1
RU1 (b1; b2) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0:5 for b2 < 3 
p
2
7
f16 3
p
2
28 ; 0:5g for b2 = 3 
p
2
7
3b2+1
4 for b2 2

3 p2
7 ; 3=4

f1116 ; 1316g for b2 = 3=4
b2+2
4 for b2 2 (3=4; 1:1]
which is plotted in Figure 1. The two intersections form two asymmetric,
pure strategy equilibria at (bi; b i) = (0:77; 0:69), i = 1; 2.
In order to nd mixed equilibria, we used Gambit with a strategy grid  
and grid size 0.01. There is one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium and
1246 asymmetric ones. The support of all Nash equilibria is contained in
[0:69; 0:81].
Appendix B: Translation of instructions
Welcome to our experiment. Please read those instructions carefully. They
are the same for every participant. Please do not talk with other participants
and remain quiet during the entire experiment. Please turn o¤ your cell
phone and dont switch it on until the end of the experiment. If you have
any question, raise your hand and we will come to you.
The experiment will consist of twenty rounds. An auction with two
bidders will take place in each round. You are one bidder, the second one is
chosen randomly for each round. So you are bidding with somebody else in
each round.
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All money during this experiment is real money. At the end of the
experiment all the money in your account will be paid to you at the rate
100 cent = 1 e. At the beginning of the experiment you are endowed with
400 cent.
Auction rules
Each round consists of one auction. During this auction the computer can
produce and sell 0, 1 or 2 units of the same good. Each unit of this good is
worth 200 cent for a bidder.
The computer has to pay production cost for each unit produced. This
production cost is the same for each unit produced in one round and is
chosen randomly for each round. Each number between 0 and 200 (with one
decimal place) has the same probability of being chosen, so each production
cost of the amount {0; 0.1; 0.2; . . . ; 199.9; 200.0) has the same probability
of being a certain rounds production cost. The costs of the di¤erent rounds
are totally independent of each other.
During each round the auction proceeds according to the following rules:
 Each bidder makes an o¤er.
 All bids from 0 to 220 cent are possible, with one decimal place {0;
0.1; 0.2; . . . ; 219.9; 220.0}.
 Each bidder can buy no more than one unit in each round.
 The computer can choose,
 either to produce 0 units and not to sell anyting to anybody,
 or to produce 1 unit and to sell it for the higher bid price to the
bidder o¤ering that price,
 or to produce 2 units and sell one to each bidder for the lower
bid price o¤ered
 The computer always chooses the option that maximizes its prot. Its
prot equals its revenues from selling the units minus its production
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cost. If two possibilities yield the same prot, the computer chooses
the one with more units sold.
Here are some examples:
You are bidding 190 cent, the other bidder is willing to pay only 140
cent. Production cost turn out to be 80 cent per unit in this round. The
computer makes the following calculation:
 If it produces and sells one unit at a price of 190 cent, it will make a
prot of: 190 cent 80 cent = 110 cent.
 If it produces two units and sells one to each bidder at a price of 140
cent (it can just demand the lower o¤er according to the rules), it will
yield a prot of 140 cent minus 80 cent per unit, this means a total
prot of: 2 x (140 cent 80 cent) = 120 cent.
This example shows that the computer will be better o¤ if it produces
two units and sells them at a price of 140 cent. So that is what it is going
to do.
You receive 200 cent per unit you purchased during the auction at the
end of the round. So for you this rounds payo¤ is
 200 cent minus the price you paid for the good, if you get one unit
 0 if you receive no unit
So in the above example you would have made a prot of
 200 cent 140 cent = 60 cent
 the same is true for the other bidder
At the end of each round you are told the value of the two bids, the
amount of units sold (0, 1 of 2), this rounds payo¤s (of you and the second
bidder), the production cost and the balance of your account. Please write
down all these data on your record sheet.
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After this, a new round starts. The bidders then are matched and the
production cost are chosen randomly again for each round. All rounds are
independent of each other.
At the end of round twenty, please answer a short questionnaire that
appears on your computer screen. After answering the questionnaire, please
come to the instructors and bring your record sheet. All the money in your
account will be paid to you in cash.
Thats all about the rules. They are the same for every participant. If
you have any question, raise your hand and we will come to you. Before
starting the experiment, please answer the questions on the following page
to make sure that you understood all the rules.
Test questions
1. If the price were 23 Cents and the computer allocated one unit to you,
what would be your payo¤ for this period?
2. If the price were 210 Cents and the computer allocated one unit to
you, what would be your payo¤ for this period?
3. If the price were 23 Cents and the computer did not allocate a unit to
you, what would be your payo¤ for this period?
Assume that production cost per unit were 60 Cents. Your bid is 150
Cents and the other bidder bids 120 Cents.
4. Calculate the computers prot if it sells 1 unit _____ and if it sells
2 units _____.
5. How many units would the computer allocate and to whom?
6. What would be your payo¤ and the payo¤ of the other bidder when
the computer chooses its better alternative?
Assume that production cost per unit were 110 Cents. Your bid is still
150 Cents and the other bidder bids 120 Cents.
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7. Calculate the computers prot if it sells 1 unit _____ and if it sells
2 units _____.
8. How many units would the computer allocate and to whom?
9. What would be your payo¤ and the payo¤ of the other bidder when
the computer chooses its better alternative?
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Figure 8: Distribution of bids for each individual subject in the uniform
price treatment, all periods.
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